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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to study school choice as a deliberate joint parental 
decision. This decision is affected by the underlying preferences of the husband and 
wife. We use survey data from a sample of parents in the metropolitan area of Bilbao 
(Spain) to estimate a bargaining discrete choice model. The collected data set contains 
hypothetical school choices gathered in the form of a typical discrete choice experiment 
(stated preferences) and the actual school choice (revealed preferences). Stated 
preference data are obtained separately for husbands and wives, but the revealed 
preference choice is taken jointly. Our findings show, firstly, that the husband’s and 
wife's stated preferences regarding school choice do not differ markedly. Secondly, the 
results obtained for the revealed preferences deviate from the stated preferences for 
some school characteristics. Finally, we find that neither the husband’s nor the wife’s 
preferences prevail in the actual joint school choice decision. 
  
 
Keywords: discrete choice modeling, joint choice, parental choice, school selection. 
JEL: C35. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the hardest decisions that parents face is that of choosing a school for 
their children. The implications are far reaching, and there is much at stake in terms of 
the prospects for future education, the selection of a learning environment, the quality of 
companionship, exposure to shared moral values, access to sports and post-school 
activities and the cost of access, as well as the effects on the family’s daily routines, 
among others. It is widely accepted that the variation in school type explains much of 
the variation in students’ educational achievements, as measured by their grades 
(Cebolla-Boado et al., 2014; Chiu, 2010) and that the school decision directly affects 
the social environment to which children are exposed daily.  
Therefore, differences in preferences between mothers and fathers, as well as 
knowing which — if any — of the two opinions prevails, or whether they compromise 
when making the actual choice, could be relevant for both policymakers (if, for 
example, the government wants to reinforce attendance to a subsidized private network, 
it might focus on the mothers because they care more about a solid bus system and 
extracurricular activities) and schools themselves (should they target mothers and 
fathers differently when looking to attract new students?). 
Differences in parenting styles or preferences between mothers and fathers have 
already been found to influence children’s sports achievements (Amorose et al., 2016), 
healthy versus non-healthy diets (Fielding-Singh, 2017; Marette et al., 2016), and most 
notably, on educational attainment (Blau and Hameiri, 2012; Davis and Brazil, 2016; 
Marissa and Ishaaq, 2012; McBride et al., 2005). Furthermore, mother’s and father’s 
schooling has also been found to affect their children’s schooling in different ways. 
Typically, regarding intergenerational transmission of schooling levels, twin-based 
studies have found that father’s schooling matters the most, whereas instrumental 
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variable based studies usually confirm the opposite (for overviews of this literature, see 
for example Black and Devereux, 2011; Holmlund et al., 2011). Contrasting with the 
previous literature, Amin et al. (2015), using a twin-based design, found that mother’s 
schooling is more important than father’s schooling for daughters’ schooling; but the 
overall effect is that mother’s schooling is equally as important as father’s schooling. 
Given the difficulty of carrying out a real-life experiment in which students are 
randomly assigned to schools in order to measure the importance schools have on 
children, one prominent line of research uses a quasi-experimental approach to tackle 
this issue: by exploiting the randomness of high school lottery winners in the Chicago 
Public School system. Cullen et al. (2006) found that lottery winners benefit on several 
non-traditional outcomes like self-reported disciplinary incidents and arrest rates. 
Angrist et al. (2011) were also able to conclude, using the randomness of charter school 
lottery winners, that Massachusetts charter schools boost students’ achievement above 
the level attained by traditional urban public schools. Other school lotteries prove that 
winners in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg middle and high school district are less likely to 
be arrested and incarcerated for serious crimes as adults (Deming, 2011), whilst an 
improvement in terms of school attainment for high school lottery winners in the same 
school district is observed only for girls (Deming et al., 2014). In order to bypass the 
inherent self-selection of exploiting the randomness of school lotteries (only the effects 
on lottery applicants are captured), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016) used grandfathered 
enrollment in charter takeovers in Boston and New Orleans with an instrumental 
variable approach, finding that grandfathered students see substantial achievement 
gains. 
On the other hand, quantitative empirical research on the subject of parental 
school choice usually focuses on the relationship between the family’s socio-economic 
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characteristics and the type of school selected (e.g., Burgess et al., 2015; Goldring and 
Phillips, 2008; Hanushek et al., 2007; Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1989). Generally, the 
conclusion of these studies is that certain schools are chosen by parents with specific 
socio-economic characteristics. As segregation by income and/or social class frequently 
exists, low-income families tend to have a restricted choice and often send their children 
to the (public) school assigned to them by the authorities in charge. The middle- and 
upper-income segments, however, have a larger choice set. 
 Furthermore, despite the increased public availability of objective test score 
indicators measuring school performance, many studies suggest that these scores are of 
limited guidance to parents when making their school choice decision. Instead, surveyed 
families state a wide array of complex reasons for choosing a particular school. For 
instance, the reasons that are most frequently mentioned for choosing a school among 
non-religious private schools include access to a smaller class size, shared beliefs, 
teaching style, proximity to home and academic reputation (Bosetti, 2004).  
School selection is likely to be a participative decision in which both parents 
share their views, yet the literature pays little attention to the joint nature of this 
decision. The aim of this study is to analyze school choice as a joint deliberate parental 
decision and to relate such a decision to the individual preference of the mother and the 
father. We see this joint choice as being determined by the underlying preferences of the 
husband and wife. We estimate these preferences by means of both stated and revealed 
choice data collected via a specifically tailored survey administered in the metropolitan 
area of Bilbao, Spain, amongst parents of primary school age children. Several other 
studies have analyzed the differences between individual and household preferences in 
the context of stated preference methods in various fields, such as transport (Hensher et 
al., 2007, 2008; O’Neill and Hess, 2014), marketing (Adamowicz et al., 2005) and 
6 
 
environmental economics (Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Lindhjem and Navrud, 
2009; Scarpa et al., 2012).  
More specifically, we propose and apply an approach that is innovative in the 
school choice literature. It consists of a modified bargaining discrete choice model first 
proposed by Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) and later modified by others (Beharry-
Borg et al., 2009; Rungie et al., 2014). These models are extended with specific scale 
parameters to handle the different natures of the stated preference from individual data 
and the revealed preference from household data. The specific contribution of this paper 
to this field of enquiry is thus to report the first application of a bargaining discrete 
choice model of school choice. The notion of joint deliberation by a party, even if it is 
comprised of only two individuals, as happens in a couple, being a fusion of the original 
individual preference, is intuitive. The bargaining term is used loosely here to denote 
that the joint decision is never completely explained by the preference of one party; 
rather, it is the result of a preference fusion or a bargaining process. The approach is 
used to identify formally which one of the individual preferences tends to prevail in the 
joint decision: in this case which member of the couple has more bargaining power 
when it comes to choosing a school. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the case 
study. Then, section 3 presents the methodology, followed by the results in Section 4. 
The last section concludes.  
 
2. Case Study 
The educational system in Basque Country contains public schools, private independent 
schools and a solid network of government-dependent private schools. These 
government-dependent private schools are privately owned but receive public funding 
(Vega-Bayo and Mariel, 2015). The system is heavily influenced by the existence of 
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two co-official languages, Spanish and Basque. Families can choose between three main 
language models based on the language(s) of instruction: Spanish, Basque or bilingual. 
The bilingual language model is a mixture of the two; some subjects are taught in 
Basque, while others are taught in Spanish. The percentage of subjects that are taught in 
each language is not regulated by the Government and therefore can vary between 
schools. Besides those three original language models, currently two novel alternatives 
exist. The first is a trilingual language model, in which subjects are taught in Basque, 
Spanish or English, and the second is an international school model, a private 
independent school that usually follows the education system in another country and 
hence teaches in that language (e.g., German, English or French). 
 The questionnaire used in our study was purposely built to analyze the influence 
of individual (husbands’ and wives’) preferences regarding the joint choice of school by 
both parents. The first section was developed to provide basic survey information to the 
parents. It described the objective, its structure and instructions on how to return the 
survey form by mail after completion via a pre-stamped envelope. The second part was 
the revealed preference (RP) section, which was answered jointly by both parents; it 
collected information regarding the school attended by the children in the family and 
was used to characterize the actual school choice made jointly by the parents. Finally, 
the stated preference (SP) section focused on hypothetical choices based on an 
experimental stated choice design (discrete choice experiment or DCE). The husband 
and wife separately answered the hypothetical school choice. This SP section 
independently asked each parent to consider three alternatives: (a) public school, (b) 
government-dependent private school and (c) independent private school. Each 
alternative was described by means of different school attributes. Each member of the 
8 
 
couple had to choose his/her preferred alternative (public, government private or 
independent private) in a sequence of twelve hypothetical choice scenarios. 
The different characteristics, or attributes, that define the hypothetical choice 
scenarios are crucial for the proper application of the DCE, given that their levels 
influence the results. We decided which attributes should be included in the DCE, that 
is, the school characteristics that are likely to be important for parents when choosing a 
school for their children, by means of a qualitative discussion focus group. During this 
exercise we also defined each attribute’s levels. Specifically, we gathered a focus group 
of 25 people that included all the relevant agents: parents, teachers, head teachers, 
principals and school administrators. The goal of this focus group was to gather 
opinions regarding the attributes that parents actually consider when choosing a school 
for their children. The participants in the focus group rated, anonymously, the relevance 
of a number of school characteristics. The results obtained from the focus group led to 
the inclusion of the following school characteristics in our choice experiment: cost, 
language of instruction, religious orientation, schooling through college (between the 
ages of 2 and 18), the presence of immigration, extracurricular activities and 
recommended by family and/or friends. 
Several other school characteristics were discarded as being only marginally 
relevant or difficult for parents to know prior to enrollment. These included the 
academic results, quality of the school’s infrastructure, dress code and political 
orientation. The participants in the focus group also debated the possible values (levels) 
that the school characteristics can take, and these are presented in Table 1.  
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TABLE 1: Attributes and Levels of the Discrete Choice Experiment 
 
Note: Attributes and levels gathered by focus group to collect opinions regarding which attributes parents 
actually consider when choosing a school for their children. 
 
One should note that, although all of the attributes appeared in each of the three 
alternatives on the choice card, certain attribute levels were alternative-specific. More 
precisely, the levels for tuition fees were fixed for each alternative, as shown in Table 1. 
Furthermore, for the linguistic model attribute, an international school could only 
appear in the independent private alternative; moreover, the higher levels of 
immigration (40% and 60%) were only included in the public school alternative. An 
example of the choice card (translated from Spanish) used in the survey is presented in 
Figure 1. 
To configure the different alternatives with varying attribute levels on each 
choice card, we generated a D-optimal factorial fractional design for a random 
parameter model. The choice card sets were generated using Ngene (ChoiceMetrics, 
2012) and consisted of four blocks of twelve rows each, taking into account that, as 
previously mentioned, some of the attribute levels were alternative-specific.  
Attributes Levels 
Cost (tuition fees) 
Public 
€0/month 
Gov. Dependent 
€50/month 
€100/month 
€150/month 
€200/month 
Indep. Private 
€300/month 
€400/month 
€500/month 
€600/month 
Distance from home 1 km 3 km 5 km 10 km 20 km 30 km 
Linguistic model 
All 
Spanish 
All 
Basque 
Bilingual 
(Basque 
and 
Spanish) 
Trilingual 
(Basque, 
Spanish 
and 
English) 
 
Interna-
tional 
School 
Religious orientation Secular Religious 
Schooling through 
college 
Yes No 
Presence of 
immigration 
0% 10% 20% 40% 60% 
Extracurricular 
activities 
Standard Extensive 
Recommended Yes No 
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Ngene (ChoiceMetrics, 2012) is a software package that can generate the 
experimental designs typically used in stated choice experiments for the purpose of 
estimating choice models, particularly of the logit type. Ngene allows for the generation 
of orthogonal designs, optimal orthogonal designs and efficient stated choice designs. 
We use a D-optimal factorial fractional design which, in contrast to an orthogonal 
design, does not minimize the correlation in the data, but aims to generate parameter 
estimates with as small as possible standard errors. 
FIGURE 1: Example of a Choice Card Presented to Parents 
 
 
Note: A hypothetical choice card presents three different alternatives – public, government-dependent 
private, and independent private schools. Each of those three alternatives is characterized by certain levels 
of each attribute. 
 
 After deciding on the attributes and their levels with help from the focus group 
and generating the experimental design, we conducted a pilot phase to check how a 
small set of parents would answer the full survey. This pilot phase was run before the 
actual implementation of the whole DCE and enabled us to ensure that the wording in 
the survey was both correct and unambiguous and that the design of the experiment 
worked, allowing for the estimation of the coefficients in the Logit-type model. 
We then handed out the questionnaires in paper form between October 2015 and 
January 2016. We randomly selected 20 schools in the Metropolitan area of Bilbao and 
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distributed to each school, in collaboration with the corresponding head teachers, 15 
pre-stamped envelopes among parents that had children aged between three and eight. 
The families were randomly chosen from the school records. The surveys were 
therefore completed by the parents at home during their spare time. Given the limited 
financial support, the collection of the survey via a pre-stamped envelope was the only 
viable alternative. The surveys were filled out autonomously by the two parents and this 
could lead to an undesirable bias. Nevertheless, some of the families (approximately 
10%) were supervised by the authors when filling out their surveys. In general, parents 
took the survey very seriously because choosing a school was a very important decision 
for them, one they had faced relatively recently. 
As previously mentioned, the survey asked the parents to answer the SP part of 
the questionnaire separately and the RP part jointly. This was essential to distinguish the 
individual preferences from the joint preference expressed as a couple. Despite the fact 
that the families were contacted through the schools’ head teachers, the response rate 
was poor (119 families, containing 238 parents, responded). This is likely to be due to 
the facts that the families were unsupervised while filling out the questionnaire and that 
they were responsible for returning their own responses themselves. Due to the 
relatively limited sample, caution is necessary when interpreting the results of the 
estimations. However, the sample data seem to be representative of the schools in the 
area, as explained by Vega-Bayo and Mariel (2016), who use the SP part of the survey 
as their data set. Their results are based on the random parameter logit model (Train, 
2009) and present an economic valuation of school characteristics by means of parents’ 
willingness to pay for certain school attributes. These willingness-to-pay values are then 
related to different socio-demographic variables to try to disentangle the underlying 
preference heterogeneity. They conclude that the language spoken at home determines 
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much of the school choice. Basque-speaking families prefer to send their children to all-
Basque schools, whereas, as expected, Spanish-speaking families prefer the bilingual or 
even the trilingual language model to the all-Spanish or all-Basque model. 
 
3. Method 
As a starting point for our analysis, we use McFadden’s (1974) random utility model. 
Under this framework the utility 𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑗 that respondent 𝑛 obtains from alternative 𝑗 in 
each choice (card) situation 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑗 = 𝜆(𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑗), with 𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗 = ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑘) + 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1                         (1) 
for a total of 𝐽 alternatives, 𝑁 individuals and 𝑇 choice cards. We assume that the 
deterministic part of the utility 𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗 is a linear combination of 𝐾 observable explanatory 
variables, attributes 𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑘 and attribute parameters 𝛽𝑘. The alternative-specific constants 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 capture the average effect on utility of all factors that are not included in the 
model. The alternative-specific constants are included only in 𝐽 − 1 utilities for 
identification purposes (Train, 2009). The parameter 𝜆 is a scale factor that is inversely 
proportional to the common standard deviation 𝜎𝜀 of the Gumbel error terms, and it is 
usually fixed to 𝜆 = 𝜋/(√6 𝜎𝜀) due to the identification so that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑛𝑡𝑗) = 𝜋
2/6. 
In our case the SP part of the survey was completed by 119 husbands and 119 
wives separately, and each spouse responded to 12 choice cards (𝑇=12) with 3 
alternatives representing the public, private and government-dependent schools (𝐽=3). 
This is why the number of observations for each gender is 𝑁=119×12=1,428. The SP 
part of the model includes the 11 attributes described above: cost, distance from home, 
linguistic model, religious orientation, schooling through college, presence of 
immigration, extracurricular activities and recommended. If models of individual 
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preferences for men and women are estimated separately, the corresponding 
deterministic parts of the utility function in equation (1) for men (𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑀) and women 
(𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑊) are defined as: 
𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑀 = 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11),                           (2) 
𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑊 = 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11).                             (3) 
The RP part of the survey collects the actual school choice made by the parents. The 
corresponding model for that joint decision includes the same attributes as (2) and (3), 
but the number of alternatives and observations differs. In our sample of 119 valid 
families, 37 different schools are chosen, meaning that in our case 𝐽=37, 𝑁=119 and 
𝑇=1 (1 choice per family, the actual choice), so the sub-index 𝑡 can be dropped. 
Therefore, the deterministic part of the utility function (1) for the real joint school 
choice is: 
𝑉𝑛𝑗
𝑅𝑃 = 𝜆𝑅𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑅𝑃𝑥𝑛𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽𝑟
𝑅𝑃𝑥𝑛𝑗11).                                      (4) 
Efficient full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of the joint model, 
which gathers SP and RP responses, can be derived by pooling the individual and joint 
choices into a single sample. If the indirect utility structures for the individual (SP) and 
joint (RP) decisions are those defined in (2), (3) and (4), then the indirect utility 
structure of the joint model is defined as 
𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗(∙) =
{
 
 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11), if 𝑛 man, 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀 = 1
𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑊 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11), if 𝑛 woman, 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊 > 0
 𝜆𝑅𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑅𝑃𝑥𝑛𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑅𝑃𝑥𝑛𝑗11) , if 𝑛 family, 𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽 > 0 }
 
 
                               (5) 
where 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀is set to one to allow the identification of 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊 and 𝜆𝑅𝑃. Our aim is to 
analyze the performance of bargaining models assuming that the members of a couple 
bargain over their joint evaluations of the alternatives based on their respective 
individual utilities (e.g., Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006). That is why the proposed 
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joint decision model includes a bargaining parameter 𝛿 and the joint parameter of each 
attribute in (4) is therefore defined as a linear combination of the SP coefficients from 
(2) and (3). Therefore, the parameters of the part of the utility that corresponds to the 
joint decision, represented by the last equation in (5), are usually defined as a weighted 
mean of the coefficients corresponding to individual choices. In that case the joint 
decision part of the utility in (5) would become 
𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑅𝑃 + ( 𝛿𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊)𝑥𝑛𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + ( 𝛿𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊)𝑥𝑛𝑗11)              (6) 
assuming that 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1. Some papers discuss that assumption and find evidence that  
𝛿1 > 1. Beharry-Borg et al. (2009) describe 𝛿 > 1 values as a symptom of the group 
polarization phenomenon, that is, the individual preferences when they are part of a 
group are even stronger than the individual responses had they not been part of the 
group. At the opposite end, Dellaert et al. (1998, p.137) suggest that 𝛿 < 0 is evidence 
of the “systematic denial of the individual’s preference in the joint evaluation.”  
Our approach deviates from the standard bargaining model defined by (6) (see 
the discussion in Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006), because the joint choices that are 
analyzed in the existing literature are expressed in a hypothetical context and do not 
represent the real behavior of the couple. That is, in the literature a parameter estimated 
from a joint decision model typically lies between the estimated parameters 𝛽 from 
individual models, and a simple linear combination (𝛿𝛽 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛽) seems like a 
suitable proposal. In our case, however, the parents’ school decision is a real choice 
manifesting a real preference, and the estimated parameter from a joint decision model 
can be on a completely different scale from the parameters estimated by individual 
models. Therefore, the corresponding parameters in the joint part of the model can 
deviate from the proposed linear combination of the SP coefficients more than is usually 
described in the literature due to the different nature of the joint decision data (RP).  
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For this reason, we redefine the joint decision part of the utility in (5) as 
𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑅𝑃 + ( 𝛿𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿) 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊) 𝜎1 𝑥𝑛𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + ( 𝛿𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊) 𝜎11 𝑥𝑛𝑗11) ,             (7) 
where new scale parameters 𝜎𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,11 account for the difference between SP 
and RP data. Obviously, some restrictions in (7) will be needed for the sake of 
identification. The parameters 𝜎𝑘 represent a measure of the average difference between 
what the members of a couple prefer as individuals in a hypothetical school choice 
context and what they actually decided jointly in the real school choice for each 
attribute. The indirect utility structure of the bargaining model therefore has the 
following form: 
𝑉𝑛𝑡𝑗(∙) =
{
 
 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11), if 𝑛 man, 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑀 = 1
𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑆𝑃𝑊 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + 𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑥𝑛𝑡𝑗11), if 𝑛 woman, 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊 > 0
𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑗
𝑅𝑃 + ( 𝛿𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿) 𝛽1
𝑆𝑃𝑊) 𝜎1 𝑥𝑛𝑗1 +∙∙∙ + ( 𝛿𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛽11
𝑆𝑃𝑊) 𝜎11 𝑥𝑛𝑗11),   if 𝑛 joint, 𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽 > 0}
 
 
 
(8) 
In this framework, 𝛿 represents the bargaining coefficient. It indicates the degree of 
prevalence of the husband’s individual utility over that of the wife’s in the real joint 
decision. O’Neill and Hess (2014) highlight the importance of different weights 𝛿 
across attributes, but these would lead in our case to an unidentified model, as each 
parameter of the joint model is already multiplied by an attribute-specific scale 𝜎𝑘. To 
enure 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1 and 𝜎𝑘 > 0, these parameters are re-parametrized as 𝛿 =
exp(𝜃) /(1 + exp(𝜃)) and 𝜎𝑘 = exp (𝜇𝑘), and the estimated parameters are 𝜃 and 
𝜇𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,11. 
 
4. Results 
Our initial data set of 119 families was reduced to 109 when we discarded the 
responses from some incorrectly completed questionnaires. Moreover, there were only 4 
observations corresponding to independent private schools. Though this was not 
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surprising given the percentage of such schools in the area, they were insufficient for us 
to estimate the coefficient of the international language model. Hence, these 
observations were also dropped and the attribute was not included in the RP part of the 
model. The final sample for our analysis included 105 families. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the school characteristics as well as 
some socio-economic characteristics of the sampled families. Our sample is restricted to 
families with children ages 3-8 living in the metropolitan area of Bilbao. That is why 
some of the characteristics present unexpected values. There are no official statistics for 
this subpopulation that could be directly comparable to ours, but according to the last 
available report of the Basque Institute for Statistics - Eustat regarding the family 
income, the average family income was 3,448 € per month. In our sample 59% of the 
families have medium income (i.e., > 3,000 € but < 6,000 €). The average number of 
children for two-parent families in the province of Vizcaya in 2011 was 1.54 and the 
percentage of people between ages 20-64 with a higher education degree was 37.23%. 
The proportion of actual public, government-dependent private and independent private 
schools in the area is 39%, 59% and 2% respectively. This means that in our sample, the 
government-dependent private schools are slightly overrepresented, which is also 
related to high percentages of higher levels of education for both parents. However, 
despite these discrepancies, the collected sample seems to represent the target 
population of the metropolitan area of Bilbao relatively well. 
TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description min. max. mean st.dev. 
            
Family and chosen school: 
     Cost Tuition fees for Government-dependent Private schools (€) 15 260 98.1 55.0 
Distance Distance from home (km) 0 20 3.6 4.0 
Immigration Presence of immigration in school (%) 0 30 6.0 5.3 
Parents: 
     Age Father Father´s age 28 58 41.4 5.0 
Age Mother Mother´s age 26 55 40.2 4.7 
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      Family and chosen school: 
 
Value Frequency 
  Schooling Schooling through college, = 0 if yes 0 32% 
  
 
 = 1 if yes  1 68% 
  Religious orientation  = 0 if secular  0 67% 
  
 
 = 1 if religious 1 33% 
  Extracurricular activities  = 0 if standard 0 39% 
  
 
 = 1 if extensive 1 61% 
  Recommended  = 0 if no 0 39% 
  
 
 = 1 if yes 1 61% 
  Children Number of children 1 28% 
  
  
2 60% 
  
  
3 12% 
  Family income  = 1 if Family income < 3000 € 1 36% 
  
 
 = 2 if 3001 € < Family income < 6000 € 2 59% 
  
 
 = 3 if Family income > 6001 € 3 5% 
  Type of school  = 1 if public 1 27% 
  
 
 = 2 if government-dependent private 2 70% 
  
 
 = 3 if independent private 3 3% 
  Parents: 
     Education husband  = 1 if no education 1 1% 
  
 
 = 2 if primary education 2 3% 
  
 
 = 3 if 1st level secondary education (compulsory,  ages 12-16) 3 8% 
  
 
 = 4 if 2nd level secondary education (optional, ages 16-18) 4 13% 
  
 
 = 5 if non-university post-secondary education (2 year “colleges”) 5 23% 
  
 
 = 6 if university education  6 32% 
  
 
 = 7 if university education + postgraduate studies 7 20% 
  Education wife  = 1 if no education 1 0% 
  
 
 = 2 if primary education 2 0% 
  
 
 = 3 if 1st level secondary education (compulsory,  ages 12-16) 3 2% 
  
 
 = 4 if 2nd level secondary education (optional, ages 16-18) 4 3% 
  
 
 = 5 if non-university post-secondary education (2 year “colleges”) 5 19% 
  
 
 = 6 if university education  6 56% 
  
 
 = 7 if university education + postgraduate studies 7 20% 
  Language home husband Language usually used with children, = 0 is Spanish, 0 86% 
  
 
 = 1, Basque 1 14% 
  Language home wife Language usually used with children, = 0 is Spanish, 0 86% 
  
 
 = 1, Basque 1 14% 
           
Source: Authors’ calculation 
The surveys were filled out autonomously by the two parents, therefore the 
independence of responses in the separate SP part of the survey cannot be guaranteed 
for all families (only 10% of the parents were supervised). Nevertheless, the data 
indicates that the parents followed the instructions for independent completion of the 
survey. 
After the completion of 12 choice cards, each parent was asked to value the 
importance of each attribute on a 10-point Likert scale. These ratings are usually 
included in DCE to analyze the attribute decision rules. They cannot be used directly in 
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a model as explanatory variables because they are by definition endogenous but they 
can be used as indicators for latent constructs in hybrid choice models (Hess and 
Hensher, 2013). This indirect use in the choice models is, however, not possible in our 
case because our sample size is limited and, therefore, not sufficiently large to allow for 
an estimation of a hybrid choice model which generally contains a very high number of 
parameters. 
Figure 2. Differences between the ratings on importance of each attribute stated 
separately by husbands and wives 
 
 
Note: Histograms present the distribution of variables defined as differences between the scores on the 
importance of each attribute. The value of zero means that the score set by both parents is the same. The 
higher absolute value of the difference, the bigger the departure in scores set by both parents.  
 
 
Nevertheless, this information can be used to analyze the differences in 
responses between husbands and wives. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of 
variables defined as differences between the scores on the importance of each attribute 
stated separately by husbands and wives. Since the ratings can take on values between 1 
and 10, the minimum possible value of these differences is -9 and the maximum 
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possible value is 9. The minimum and maximum values and standard deviations in 
Table 3 show that these differences have a very large spread. Moreover, for the 
attributes Distance and Inmigration the null hypothesis that the difference is zero is 
rejected at the 5% significance level. It seems to be an indication of within-family 
variation represented by the ratings, and an indication that the surveys were filled out 
separately. This conclusion is also supported by the bar plots of these differences, 
depicted in Figure 2. As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of these differences is wide 
and the percentages of families with the same score assigned to an attribute (i.e., the 
difference is equal to zero) are relatively low, varying between 17 % and 39 %. 
As expected, the most homogenous scores are obtained for the attribute 
Language of instruction and Cost. As explained above, the language of instruction is a 
critical attribute for many families and this proximity of husbands and wives scores is, 
therefore, expected. The cost of schooling is usually an important part of the family 
budget, thus, the similarity of scores is also an expected result.  The biggest differences 
correspond to the attribute Extracurricular Activities. The parent who is more involved 
in the daily routine of the children can be more concerned about extracurricular 
activities assigning a higher rating to this attribute, and this is probably why these 
differences are observed. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the differences between the scores on importance 
of each attribute stated separately by husbands and wives 
  
Variable min. max. mean st.dev. t-test p-value 
                 
Cost  -6 7 -0.22 2.03 -1.11 0.27 
 Distance to home -8 6 -0.51 2.32 -2.23 0.03 ** 
Extracurricular activities -7 8 0.14 2.41 0.61 0.54 
 Immigration -8 6 -0.55 2.46 -2.27 0.02 ** 
Instruction language -5 3 -0.13 1.38 -0.93 0.35 
 Schooling 2-18 -7 8 -0.08 2.60 -0.30 0.76 
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Recommended -7 7 0.23 2.32 1.01 0.31 
 Religious orientation -9 9 -0.26 3.31 -0.80 0.43 
                 
Note: Descriptive statistics of variables defined as differences between the scores on the importance of 
each attribute represented in histograms in Figure 2.  
               
The qualitative attributes linguistic model, religious orientation, schooling 
through college, extracurricular activities and recommended were effect coded (Bech 
and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005), and the quantitative attributes cost, distance from home and 
presence of immigration were divided by 100, 10 and 10, respectively, to avoid 
numerical issues in the estimation process. All the models presented below were 
estimated in PythonBiogeme (Bierlaire, 2003, 2008) by maximum likelihood. 
The separate estimations of the three conditional logit models for the families’, 
husbands’ and wives’ choices presented in Table 4 lead to exactly the same results as an 
estimation of the joint conditional logit model defined in (5) and (1) applied to a pooled 
sample. The maximized LogL=-2,379.3 of the pooled model equals the sum of the 
maximized LogL values of the three separate models presented in Table 4, leading to 
the conclusion that the scale factors 𝜆𝑆𝑃𝑊  and 𝜆𝑅𝑃𝐽can be set to one (Swait and 
Louviere, 1993). 
 TABLE 4: Separate Estimation MNL 
 
Joint 
   
Men (SP) 
  
Women (SP) 
 
 
Decision (RP) 
𝛽𝑅𝑃 
  
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑀 
   
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑊 
  
 
Coeff. Rob. t  
  
Coeff. Rob. t  
  
Coeff. Rob. t  
 Cost  -0.77 -1.44 * 
 
-0.26 -4.06 ***
 
-0.25 -3.57 *** 
Distance from home -0.52 -8.44 *** 
 
-0.06 -1.23   
 
-0.05 -1.47 * 
Extracurricular activities 0.54 2.89 *** 
 
-0.06 -1.47 * 
 
0.11 2.71 *** 
Immigration 0.12 0.90   
 
-0.16 -4.85 *** 
 
-0.11 -3.63 *** 
Bilingual 0.92 1.63 * 
 
0.22 2.50 *** 
 
0.33 4.29 *** 
International 
  
  
 
0.54 2.73 *** 
 
0.17 0.81   
All Spanish -0.78 -1.45 * 
 
-0.75 -7.29 *** 
 
-0.87 -9.40 *** 
Trilingual 0.11 0.17   
 
0.66 7.57 *** 
 
0.34 4.49 *** 
Schooling 2–18 -0.16 -0.66   
 
-0.09 -2.07 *** 
 
0.01 0.15   
Recommended 1.63 7.05 *** 
 
0.08 2.09 *** 
 
0.04 0.96   
Religious orientation -1.15 -2.41 *** 
 
-0.20 -4.06 *** 
 
-0.15 -3.10 *** 
ASC gov.-dependent 2.06 2.27 *** 
 
0.76 5.76 *** 
 
0.72 6.02 *** 
ASC private 
  
  
 
0.03 0.09   
 
0.49 1.71 ** 
            LogL -107.3 
   
-1130.7 
   
-1141.3 
  Num. of parameters 11 
   
13 
   
13 
  Choices 105 
   
1191 
   
1198 
              *** 5%, ** 10%, * 20%, Rob. t. stands for robust t-statistic 
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The SP results for men and women presented in the third and fifth columns of 
Table 4 are very similar, indicating that there are no large differences between 
husbands’ and wives’ preferences regarding the school choice in the metropolitan area 
of Bilbao. The highest coefficients (in absolute values) correspond to the cost and the 
language of instruction (bilingual, international, all Spanish and trilingual), 
highlighting these as the most important attributes in school choice. The language of 
instruction is a critical attribute for many families, because proper knowledge of Basque 
is desirable, either because of the sense of pride and cultural identity inherent to Basque 
society or because of the high unemployment rate combined with the language policy 
regarding civil servants (most civil service jobs in Basque Country require knowledge 
of Basque at the C1 level in the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages, i.e., advanced or proficient users). These issues, together with the fact that it 
is widely accepted in the area that to speak Basque well enough the all-Spanish 
language model should be avoided, explain the observed positive preference for the 
other language models. 
Regarding the remaining attributes, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Distance has a very low coefficient, and it is even insignificant for men, implying that 
for them school distance does not appear to be an important characteristic. 
Extracurricular activities is the only attribute for which members of couples have 
opposite preferences. This could be related to the fact that extracurricular activities are 
more relevant to mothers than to fathers. Mothers are usually the ones who pick up the 
children and are therefore more likely than their husbands to be concerned about 
extracurricular activities. The importance of these activities is also related to the 
publicly recognized problem of long working hours in Spain, which makes it harder to 
reconcile work and family life (Sánchez, 2016).  
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Immigration causes disutility in both mothers and fathers. This is in line with 
other findings in the empirical literature, suggesting that there is some evidence of 
segregation in schools (e.g. Bifulco and Ladd, 2007; Denessen et al., 2005; Elacqua, 
2012). The schooling 2–18 and recommended attributes have very low coefficients (in 
absolute values) and are insignificant for women. Finally, the attribute religious 
orientation presents a negative and relatively high (in absolute values) coefficient, 
indicating that on average families prefer secular schools nowadays. 
The RP model of the joint decision leads to markedly different coefficient 
estimates, as one can observe in the first column of Table 4. The highest coefficients in 
absolute values correspond to recommended and religious orientation. This indicates 
that, when it comes to the real school choice, parents pay more attention to these 
attributes than they stated in the SP part of the survey. The difference in the 
recommended coefficients was expected: not many people send their children to a 
school for which they do not have at least some degree of recommendation, even if it is 
only through mere acquaintances. Given the high (in absolute values) negative 
coefficient of religious orientation in the RP, the majority of the families on average 
prefer a secular school even more strongly than in the hypothetical choice, but this 
school attribute can be controversial and decisive in parents’ decision (Cohen-Zada and 
Justman, 2012). 
The language of instruction (bilingual, international, all Spanish and trilingual) 
coefficients generally indicate the same results as in the SP data estimation (the 
bilingual linguistic model is the preferred one overall, and the all-Spanish linguistic 
model is the rejected one), but they are less important than in the SP model. 
Surprisingly, the immigration coefficient is not significant, showing that on average the 
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parents in the metropolitan area of Bilbao do not consider it to be an important issue; 
immigration is generally not a problem in most of the schools in the area. 
TABLE 5: Joint Bargaining Model 
 
Joint Decision 
(RP) 
      
Men 
(SP) 
   
Women 
(SP) 
  
  
  
𝜇𝑘       
  
𝛽𝑅𝑃       
  
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑀       
  
𝛽𝑆𝑃𝑊     
 
Scale coeff. Rob. t  
  
Coeff. Rob. t  
  
Coeff. Rob. t  
  
Coeff. Rob. t  
 Cost  1.09 1.53 * 
   
 
 
-0.26 -4.06 *** 
 
-0.25 -3.57 *** 
Distance from home 2.27 4.02 *** 
   
  
 
-0.06 -1.23   
 
-0.05 -1.47 * 
Extracurricular activities 2.69 0.79   
   
  
 
-0.06 -1.47 * 
 
0.11 2.71 *** 
Immigration 
  
  
 
0.12 0.90   
 
-0.16 -4.85 *** 
 
-0.11 -3.63 *** 
Bilingual 
  
  
 
0.92 1.63 * 
 
0.22 2.50 *** 
 
0.33 4.29 *** 
International 
  
  
     
0.54 2.73 *** 
 
0.17 0.81   
All Spanish 
  
  
 
-0.78 -1.45 * 
 
-0.75 -7.29 *** 
 
-0.87 -9.40 *** 
Trilingual 
  
  
 
0.11 0.17   
 
0.66 7.57 *** 
 
0.34 4.49 *** 
Schooling 2–18 1.52 0.57   
   
  
 
-0.09 -2.07 *** 
 
0.01 0.15   
Recommended 3.32 6.56 *** 
   
  
 
0.08 2.09 *** 
 
0.04 0.96   
Religious orientation 
  
  
 
-1.15 -2.41 *** -0.20 -4.06 *** 
 
-0.15 -3.10 *** 
ASC gov.-dependent  
  
  
 
2.06 2.27 *** 0.76 5.76 *** 
 
0.72 6.02 *** 
ASC private 
  
  
   
  
 
0.03 0.09   
 
0.49 1.71 ** 
                
 
𝜃 
              
 
Bargaining 
coeff. Rob. t  
             
 
-0.30 -0.09  
                               
LogL -2379.3 
              Num. of parameters 38 
                                
*** 5%, ** 10%, * 20%, Rob. t. stands for robust t-statistic 
  
The estimation of the bargaining model (8) is presented in Table 5. The 
coefficients corresponding to the individual husband’s and wife’s decisions based on SP 
data are presented in the fifth and seventh columns of Table 5, and these are almost 
identical to the coefficients in Table 4 that correspond to the separate estimation. The 
first and third columns of Table 5 present the estimations corresponding to the RP part 
of the bargaining model. The linear combination of the individual coefficients 
( 𝛿𝛽𝑘
𝑆𝑃𝑀 + (1 − 𝛿) 𝛽𝑘
𝑆𝑃𝑊) could not be estimated for all the attributes, as most were 
effect coded, which, together with the limited sample size of the RP data, made the 
estimated likelihood function flat, causing convergence problems in the estimation 
procedure. Therefore, some of the coefficients (immigration, bilingual, all Spanish, 
trilingual and religious orientation) were eliminated from the bargaining structure and 
estimated as in the previous conditional logit model defined in (5) and (1). The 
bargaining parameter 𝛿 was included only in the remaining attributes. Its estimation is 
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not significantly different from zero. This means that on average neither the husbands’ 
nor the wives’ preferences have a larger influence on the final school choice, since 𝛿 =
exp(0) = 0.5. That is, the parents’ preferences are equally important in the actual 
school choice. This means that, even though the social position of women in Basque 
society has traditionally been better than in neighboring cultures (Ortiz-Osés and Mayr, 
1981), their opinion does not prevail over their husband’s when it comes to making the 
joint choice of a school for their children. 
As mentioned above, language has a very strong role in the Basque Country 
educational system. This is clearly not the case in most other areas in Spain or other 
countries. Therefore, the results cannot be extrapolated easily and must be interpreted 
with caution. This strong language-preference dimension could be affecting our results, 
especially if we consider that assortative mating of parents might be very strongly based 
on the language. This is supported by the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2, which 
indicates that all parents in our sample use the same language to communicate with their 
children. The bargaining process could be influenced by this issue. This can be one of 
the reasons why the parents’ preferences are equally important in the actual school 
choice, since the strong language-preference dimension might influence other 
dimensions and the whole bargaining process. 
The first column of Table 5 presents the estimation of the scale parameters  
𝜇𝑘 defined in (8). Their values indicate the closeness (or distance) between the couple’s 
real choice and the hypothetical one in the stated preferences. One can observe that 
three out of five scale parameters are significant, indicating that the revealed 
preferences for these attributes deviate markedly from the stated preferences. According 
to our results, parents are more sensitive to the cost of the school than they state in the 
hypothetical part of the survey and they pay more attention to the distance to the school. 
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Lastly, they place more weight on the school being recommended than they state in the 
hypothetical choice. This comparison of the RP and SP figures shows that our results 
are mixed, given that some SP coefficients of our bargaining model are not unlike the 
RP data, while there are some coefficients that differ significantly.  
As a last step, we analyze the within-family differences in preferences for each 
school attribute. Our data set does not contain sufficient information at the family or 
individual level to allow for the estimation of individual coefficients of our choice 
model, because there is only one observation for the joint family RP choice and twelve 
observations per each husband and wife. This is why we focus on individual specific 
mean coefficients (Greene et al., 2005; Hess, 2010), which can be obtained from a 
mixed logit model. The mixed logit model (Hensher and Greene, 2003; McFadden and 
Train, 2000) allows us to incorporate random coefficients in a choice model. This is 
done by assuming a specific distribution for each coefficient and estimating that 
distribution’s corresponding parameters. The specific coefficient for each respondent, 
representing his/her specific individual preference, would therefore be drawn from that 
distribution. Since there is usually not enough information collected to estimate the 
individual preferences, we focus on specific subgroups. Thus, we can distinguish 
between the distribution of tastes in the population, and the distribution of tastes in the 
subpopulation of respondents who make particular choices. 
The conditional distribution (Greene et al., 2005; Hess, 2010) of random 
coefficients depends on some parameters in the subpopulation of people who make a 
specific sequence of choices when facing the same choice tasks. Typically, the 
conditional distribution allows us to analyze various aspects of the conditional 
distribution, such as differences between men and women or young and old people.   
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We therefore estimate a Random Parameter Logit model, which belongs to the 
family of Mixed Logit models (Hensher and Greene, 2003; McFadden and Train, 2000), 
separately for wives and husbands, by maximizing the corresponding simulated log-
likelihood function using 2000 random Halton draws. The estimation results are 
presented in Table 6. These results generalize the results for wives and husbands 
presented in the third and fifth columns of Table 4, since all of the coefficients are now 
assumed to be normally distributed. The estimated means and standard deviations of 
these distributions for men are presented in the third and fifth columns of Table 6, and 
the seventh and ninth columns present the estimations for women. The general 
conclusions obtained from Table 6 are very similar to the conclusions from Table 4. 
  TABLE 6: Separate Estimation RPL 
 
RPL SP MEN 
    
RPL SP WOMEN 
                              
 
Coeff. Rob. t  
 
St. Dev. Rob. t  
 
Coeff. Rob. t  
 
St. Dev. Rob. t  
 Cost  -0.494 -5.37 *** 0.335 7.12 *** -0.398 -4.19 *** 0.271 6.29 *** 
Distance to home -0.124 -1.87 * 0.303 4.41 *** -0.099 -1.64   0.436 7.26 *** 
Extracurricular activities -0.183 -1.90 * 0.077 0.22   0.225 2.26 ** 0.214 1.05   
Immigration -0.219 -4.63 *** 0.194 3.45 *** -0.157 -3.65 *** 0.184 3.50 *** 
Bilingual 0.375 2.86 *** 0.016 0.09   0.135 0.78   0.324 0.84   
International 0.590 1.99 ** 0.704 2.11 ** -0.194 -0.58   0.829 2.20 ** 
All Spanish -0.940 -4.66 *** 0.883 3.69 *** -1.686 -6.70 *** 1.097 4.36 *** 
Trilingual 0.952 5.87 *** 0.471 2.45 ** 0.134 0.73   0.670 3.83 *** 
Schooling 2-18 -0.266 -2.07 ** 0.728 5.43 *** 0.010 0.10   0.054 0.16   
Recommended 0.216 2.12 ** 0.415 2.83 *** 0.141 1.35   0.177 0.78   
Religious orientation -0.618 -4.33 *** 0.771 5.51 *** -0.419 -2.90 *** 0.876 6.13 *** 
ASC Gov. dependent private 0.637 1.85   
  
  0.243 0.90   
  
  
ASC Private -0.635 -1.41 * 
  
  -0.773 -2.21 ** 
  
  
                          
LogL -1065.500 
     
-1064.900 
     Choices 1191 
     
1198 
     Num. of parameters 24 
     
24 
     *** 5%, ** 10%, * 20%, Rob. t. stands for robust t-statistic 
 
Subsequently, using the estimations from Table 6 we estimate the individual 
specific means of the conditional distribution, that is, the means of a distribution in the 
subpopulation of people who make a specific sequence of choices when facing the same 
choice tasks. Given these individual specific means, we can compute the within-family 
differences in preferences for each school attribute, obtaining a measure of their 
proximity or distance. These differences can be further analyzed for different subgroups 
(socio-demographic categories). 
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Figure 3 presents the box-and-whisker plot of the distributions of the within-
family differences in preferences for each school attribute, for two family income 
categories. The category of low income is defined as a family income of less than 3000 
€/month. Likewise, the category of high income is defined as a family income higher 
than 3000 €/month. Figure 4 presents the within-family differences in preferences for 
each school attribute, for two parental educational categories. The category of university 
education is defined as both parents having a university degree or a higher educational 
level. Similarly, Figure 5 presents the within-family differences in preferences for each 
school attribute, for two parental age categories. The young category families have at 
least one parent who is less than 41 years old. 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 suggest that family income and parental education and age do 
not have a big impact on the within-family differences in preferences for each school 
attribute regarding the school choice. Given the relatively wide spread of all 
distributions presented in these three figures, the null hypothesis of an equal mean for 
each pair of opposed categories would not be rejected in any comparison. However, this 
is probably a result of having a relatively small sample. Nevertheless, the differences in 
Figure 5 are generally bigger in comparison to Figures 3 and 4, leading to the 
conclusion that age probably has the biggest impact on the within-family differences in 
preferences for each school attribute among the analyzed socio-demographic variables. 
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Figure 3: Within-family differences in preferences for each school attribute 
for two family income categories
 
Note: Box-and-whisker plot of the distributions of the within-family differences in preferences for two 
family income categories. The category of low income is defined as a family income of less than 3000 
€/month and the category of high income higher than 3000 €/month 
 
Figure 4: Within-family differences in preferences for each school attribute 
for two parental education categories 
 
 
Note: Box-and-whisker plot of the distributions of the within-family differences in preferences for two 
categories. The category of university education is defined as both parents having a university degree or a 
higher educational level. The category of no university represents all other families. 
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 Figure 5: Within-family differences in preferences for each school attribute 
for two parental age categories 
 
Note: Box-and-whisker plot of the distributions of the within-family differences in preferences for two 
age categories. The young category families have at least one parent who is less than 41 years old. The 
remaining families are in the category old. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
In this paper we study school choice as a joint parental deliberate decision 
affected by the underlying preferences of the husband and wife. We use a bargaining 
discrete choice model simultaneously estimated with real data and hypothetical choices 
obtained by means of a DCE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application 
of a bargaining discrete choice model regarding the issue of parental school choice for 
children. 
It is important to understand the underlying parental decision process thoroughly 
for many different reasons. A proper understanding can be useful for the definition of 
policy mechanisms devoted to issues of educational opportunity, social inequity or 
transportation grants. However, the parental decision also has an impact in related fields 
like household residential choice (Brasington and Haurin, 2009; Millimet and 
Rangaprasad, 2007). Better knowledge of the underlying parental decision process 
allows for a better definition of the objectives and functioning of the school choice 
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schemes defined by policy makers and educational leaders. Subsequently, they can 
define better regulations or financial support for certain policies.  
One of the key findings is that stated preferences deviate from revealed 
preferences. The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (Government of the 
Basque Country, 1979), which is the basic institutional law of the Basque Country; 
together with the Basic Law of the Normalization of the Usage of the Basque Language 
(Government of the Basque Country, 1982), which was a development of the rights 
concerning the Basque language mentioned in the Statute, guarantee that students will 
have the right to choose to be educated in either Basque or Spanish (or both). Hence, 
every public school should, in principle, offer all three options concerning the language 
model, which is undoubtedly the most important characteristic for parents.  
In practice, what happens is that families are segregated into different areas or 
neighborhoods and therefore, even though schools should offer all the options, some 
schools end up not having the Spanish language model (but this is due to demand, not 
supply). Hence, families who want their children to study in Spanish must choose a 
school a bit further away. This is supported, firstly, by the mentioned legal documents 
themselves: although the Basic Law of the Normalization of the Usage of the Basque 
Language initially ensures every student’s right to choose his or her education in 
Basque or Spanish in the different education levels, it also concedes in article 16 that, in 
order to do this in practice, the Basque Government will regulate the different language 
models of the different schools, taking into account the parents’ will and the socio-
linguistic characteristics of the area. Secondly, Table 7 shows the distribution of the 
immigration and language models in the main sub-area of the analyzed region; this data 
also supports that the mentioned segregation exists. 
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TABLE 7: Distribution of the population, school type and language models in the 
analyzed region. 
 % of population born in 
% of students in 
each school type 
% of students in each 
language model 
 
Basque 
Country 
Spain 
Out of 
Spain 
Public Private Spanish Mixed Basque 
Valle de Asua 77.80 16.10 6.10 21.08 78.92 24.39 36.82 38.79 
Margen Izquierda 66.75 26.48 6.77 50.00 50.00 4.10 41.79 54.10 
Margen Derecha 74.32 16.90 8.78 40.86 59.14 19.84 26.45 53.71 
Bilbao 67.68 21.87 10.45 43.05 56.95 3.25 37.35 59.40 
Source: Department of Education of the Government of the Basque Country and Eustat – Instituto Vasco 
de Estadística (Basque Statistics Institute). 
 
There are also numerous articles and reports regarding the widespread practice 
of families who (falsely) declare themselves living someplace (for example, at the 
student’s grandparents’ home) in order to receive more points and gain access to a 
coveted school (Alonso, 2017; López, 2010; Pérez de Nanclares, 2016). The Basque 
Government is aware of this issue and is fighting against it, partly because this leads to 
even more socio-economic segregation, since the type of parents who can carry out this 
practice are usually non-immigrants who have their own families living in perhaps more 
desirable neighborhoods than their own (Department of Education of the Basque 
Country, 2015; Viñas, 2016). 
The second interesting result of our study is that husbands’ and wives’ stated 
preferences regarding school choice in the metropolitan area of Bilbao are not markedly 
different. In general, all the coefficients in the stated preferences are similar for men and 
women. The only exception is represented by the extracurricular activities coefficient, 
which is probably a result of the mother’s higher degree of involvement in the 
organization of the children’s daily routine. This is an important result from the data 
collection point of view. If we focus on data collection aimed at stated preferences for 
school choice, responses by only one of the spouses seem to be sufficient to represent 
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the household preferences. This notably simplifies the data collection process and 
therefore makes it much cheaper, because there is no necessity to gather responses from 
both spouses. 
Our third finding is that the results representing the couple’s stated preferences 
deviate from the revealed preferences for some attributes, such as cost, distance and 
recommended, which is quite a common result in the literature. Stated preferences can 
deviate from revealed preferences for different reasons (List and Gallet, 2001). The 
complexity of the school choice environment in Bilbao can be one of those reasons. The 
literature offers a wide variety of explanations concerning hypothetical biases and 
proposes various corrections, but there is no consensus regarding the best method to 
correct for hypothetical bias. What we assume is that, if there is indeed hypothetical 
bias, it would be the same for husbands and wives, and that would allow for a 
comparison of their preferences. 
 SP surveys offer very valuable results regarding the relative importance of a 
service’s or product’s different attributes, but the real willingness-to-pay values for 
those characteristics can differ from the hypothetical figures obtained from SP data. The 
former literature comparing the RP and SP methodologies shows the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two approaches. RP methods may be preferred because they are 
based on actual instead of hypothetical choices. However, RP methods use historical 
data, while SP methods allow for the analysis of new, still unimplemented policies. 
Some authors find similar results obtained by the two approaches (Whitehead et al., 
2010), while most applications indicate important discrepancies between them (Bigerna 
et al., 2016; Hoyos and Riera, 2013; Loureiro and Rahmani, 2016; Morgan and Huth, 
2011). Our results are therefore in line with the literature, as the existing studies show 
that the results vary widely between RP and SP data. This result has important 
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implications for future studies, showing that, if the parental preferences regarding 
school choice are the objective of a study, RP data would be the appropriate data set to 
use. 
The fourth notable result is that neither the husband’s nor the wife’s preferences 
prevail in the school choice. This appears to a certain extent to contradict some previous 
findings, which suggest that mothers are on average more involved in school choice 
(David et al., 1994; Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Woollard, 2010). Specifically, David et al. 
(1994) examine the process of choosing secondary schools in two inner-London 
boroughs through a series of interviews and find that, in nearly half of the schools, 
mothers had the main responsibility for choosing and were invariably involved in the 
process, unlike fathers. Taylor (2002) also uses a cognitive survey type of analysis to 
study the decision-making process of families and finds that there is great variation in 
the roles of the two parents when choosing a school. By conducting several parent 
interviews in Edmonton (Canada), Taylor and Woollard (2010) analyze how parents 
choose a high school for their children and how this process varies depending on the 
socio-economic status of families. They also find that mothers are on average more 
involved. 
We have shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 that the ratings on importance of 
attributes differ between husbands and wives and, therefore, the similarity of the 
husband’s and the wife’s preferences is not caused by the unmonitored collection of the 
data. These two results are not contradictory. The importance of each attribute is rated 
by each spouse separately from the other attributes. That is, a rating is assigned to an 
attribute without taking into account the importance of the remaining attributes. In this 
rating the husband’s and wife’s responses differ. But, this separate rating approach is 
very different from choosing an alternative in a DCE which requires an evaluation of 
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the whole combination of attributes that describes an alternative (type of school). Our 
results show that when all attributes are evaluated at the same time, there are no 
significant differences between husband’s and wife’s preferences.  This result together 
with the conclusion that neither the husband’s nor the wife’s preferences prevail in the 
school choice must be, however, taken with caution given the limited sample size. 
However, one should note that these studies are based on cognitive interviews 
concerning the school choice decision process and not on actual experimental data like 
ours; they also focus on secondary schools instead of primary ones. In their case the 
school choice decision is made not only by the parents but also by the children 
themselves, which changes the dynamics of the process. However, our findings could be 
related to a difference in the earnings or level of attained education between men and 
women, and it might be worthwhile exploring this issue further. 
In general, there is a growing literature providing evidence that household 
savings and investment are affected by the person in the household, husband or wife, 
who has greater decision power. Several experiments conducted in African countries 
show evidence that money handed to women is more likely to be used for expenses such 
as education, children’s nutrition and housing than money given to their male 
counterparts (Duflo, 2003; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). 
The last –but not least– conclusion is that the DCE methodology allows us to 
analyze the within-family differences in preferences for each school attribute, and for 
different subgroups of the population. This approach could help to disentangle the 
family school choice decision process even more. Studying the influence of different 
socio-demographic characteristics on the school choice decision could clarify the 
dynamics this decision and the real nature of the parental bargaining process. 
35 
 
Future research that applies a bargaining discrete choice model to the issue of 
school choice should consider random parameters not only in the stated preferences, but 
also in the revealed preference parts of the model, allowing for taste heterogeneity 
between men and women. It will, however, imply a high level of effort in the data 
collection, since only one revealed preference choice is obtained per household and the 
random parameter model requires relatively large samples. Future studies could also 
collect data on which family member is the main source of school information. If 
information is prevalently collected by one of the partners, there might be little room for 
the other partner to elaborate different preferences. This information could therefore 
help disentangle the preference heterogeneity between families or parents.  
36 
 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by the Department of the Environment of the Basque 
Government and the Department of Education of the Basque Government [grant IT-
642-13; UPV/EHU Econometrics Research Group] and the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness [grants ECO2014-52587-R and ECO2015-64467-R]. 
This paper was partially written when the first author was visiting the Durham 
University Business School. He gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the 
Basque Government [Ikermugikortasuna 2016] for this stay. We would also like to 
thank all the school managers and administrators who helped with the collection of 
parents' responses. Special thanks to Artxandako Trueba Ikastetxea, Azkorri Ikastetxea, 
Basauri Ikastetxea Irakaskuntza Kooperatiba Elkartea, Begoñako Andra Mari Ikastetxea 
and El Regato Ikastetxea. 
  
37 
 
References 
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Angrist, J.D., Hull, P.D., Pathak, P.A., 2016. Charters without 
lotteries: Testing takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Am. Econ. Rev. 
106(7), 1878–1920. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150479 
Adamowicz, W., Hanemann, M., Swait, J., Johnson, R., Layton, D., Regenwetter, M., 
Reimer, T., Sorkin, R., 2005. Decision strategy and structure in households: A 
“groups” perspective. Marketing Letters 16(3), 387–399. 
Alonso, I., 2017. Educación detecta 105 matrículas escolares con padrones fraudulentos 
[Education detects 105 school applications with fraudulent census]. 
http://www.deia.com/2017/01/09/sociedad/euskadi/educacion-detecta-105-
matriculas-con-padrones-fraudulentos-el-90-en-araba (accessed 23 July 2017). 
Amin, V., Lundborg, P., Rooth, D.O., 2015. The intergenerational transmission of 
schooling: Are mothers really less important than fathers? Econ. Educ. Rev. 
47, 100–117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2015.01.008 
Amorose, A.J., Anderson-Butcher, D., Newman, T.J., Fraina, M., Iachini, A., 2016. 
High school athletes’ self-determined motivation: The independent and 
interactive effects of coach, father, and mother autonomy support. Psychology 
of Sport and Exercise 26, 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2016.05.005 
Angrist, J.D., Pathak, P.A., Walters, C.R., 2011. Explaining charter school 
effectiveness. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 5(4), working 
paper no. 17322. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.1 
Bech, M., Gyrd-Hansen, D., 2005. Effects coding in discrete choice experiments. Health 
Economics 14, 1079–1083. 
38 
 
Beharry-Borg, N., Hensher, D.A., Scarpa, R., 2009. An analytical framework for joint 
vs separate decisions by couples in choice experiments: the case of coastal 
water quality in Tobago. Environmental and Resource Economics 43(1), 95–
117. 
Bierlaire, M., 2003. BIOGEME: a free package for the estimation of discrete choice 
models, in: Chevroulet, T., Sevestre, A. (Eds.), Proc. 3rd Swiss Transportation 
Research Conf., March 19–21, 2003, Monte-Verita, Ascona, Switzerland. 
Bierlaire, M., 2008. An Introduction to BIOGEME Version 1.7. 
http://www.biogeme.epfl.ch. (accessed 23 July 2017) 
Bifulco, R., Ladd, H.F., 2007. School choice, racial segregation, and test‐score gaps: 
evidence from North Carolina’s charter school program. J. Pol. Anal. Manag. 
26(1), 31–56. 
Bigerna, S., Bollino, C.A., Micheli, S., Polinori, P., 2017. Revealed and stated 
preferences for CO2 emissions reduction: The missing link. Renew. 
Sustainable Energy Rev. 68 (2), 1213-1221. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.02.020 
Black, S. E., Devereux,P. J., 2011. Recent developments in intergenerational mobility. 
In Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, pp. 1487–1541. 
Blau, I., Hameiri, M., 2012. Teacher-families online interactions and gender differences 
in parental involvement through school data system: Do mothers want to know 
more than fathers about their children? Computers and Education 59(2), 701–
709. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2012.03.012 
Bosetti, L., 2004. Determinants of school choice: understanding how parents choose 
elementary schools in Alberta. Journal of Education Policy 19(4), 387–405. 
39 
 
Brasington, D.M., Haurin, D.R., 2009. Parents, peers, or school inputs: which 
components of school outcomes are capitalized into house value? Reg. Sci. 
Urban Econ. 39(5), 523–529. 
Burgess, S., Greaves, E., Vignoles, A., Wilson, D., 2015. What parents want: school 
preferences and school choice. Economic Journal 125(587), 1262–1289. 
Cebolla-Boado, H., Radl, J., Salazar, L., 2014. Aprendizaje y ciclo vital. La desigualdad 
de oportunidades desde la educación preescolar hasta la edad adulta. Colección 
Estudios Sociales  39, 1–177. 
Chiu, M.M., 2010. Effects of inequality, family and school on mathematics 
achievement: country and student differences. Social Forces 88(4), 1645–1676. 
http://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2010.0019 
ChoiceMetrics, 2012. Ngene 1.1.1 User Manual & Reference Guide. Sydney. Australia. 
Cohen-Zada, D., Justman, M., 2012. Affinity and tension between religious 
denominations: evidence from private school enrollment. Reg. Sci. Urban 
Econ. 42(6), 950–960. 
Cullen, J. B., Jacob, B. A., Levitt, S., 2006. The effect of school choice on participants: 
Evidence from randomized lotteries. Econometrica, 74(5), 1191–1230. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00702.x 
David, M., West, A., Ribbens, J., 1994. Mother’s Intuition? Choosing Secondary 
Schools. Falmer, London. 
Davis, J., Brazil, N. (2016). Disentangling fathers’ absences from household 
remittances in international migration: The case of educational attainment in 
40 
 
Guatemala. International Journal of Educational Development 50, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2016.05.004 
 
Dellaert, B.G.C., Prodigalidad, M., Louviere, J.J., 1998. Family members’ projections 
of each other’s preference and influence: A two-stage conjoint approach. 
Marketing Letters 9(2), 135–145.  
Deming, D.J., 2011. Better schools, less crime? Q. J. Econ. 126(4), 2063–2115. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr036 
Deming, D.J., Hastings, J.S., Kane, T.J., Staiger, D.O. (2014). School choice, school 
quality, and postsecondary attainment. Am. Econ. Rev. 104(3), 991–1013. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.3.991 
Denessen, E., Driessena, G., Sleegers, P., 2005. Segregation by choice? A study of 
group‐specific reasons for school choice. Journal of Education Policy 20(3), 
347–368. 
Department of Education of the Basque Country, 2015. Orden de 10 de diciembre de 
2015 de la Consejera de Educación [Order of December 10th, 2015 of the 
Adviser of Education]. 
Dosman, D., Adamowicz, W., 2006. Combining stated and revealed preference data to 
construct an empirical examination of intrahousehold bargaining. Review of 
Economics of the Household 4, 15–34. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-005-
6695-1 
Duflo, E., 2003. Grandmothers and granddaughters: old age pension and intra-
household allocation in South Africa. World Bank Economic Review 17(1), 1–
25. 
41 
 
Elacqua, G., 2012. The impact of school choice and public policy on segregation: 
evidence from Chile. International Journal of Educational Development 32(3), 
444–453. 
Fielding-Singh, P., 2017. Dining with dad: Fathers’ influences on family food practices. 
Appetite 117, 98–108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2017.06.013 
Goldring, E.B., Phillips, K.J., 2008. Parent preferences and parent choices: the public–
private decision about school choice. Journal of Education Policy 23(3), 209–
230. 
Government of the Basque Country, 1979. Ley Órganica 3/1979 de Estatuto de 
Autonomía para el País Vasco [Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country]. 
Government of the Basque Country, 1982. Ley 10/1982 Básica de normalización del 
uso del Euskera [Basic Law of the Normalization of the Usage of the Basque 
Language]. 
Greene, W.H., Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M., 2005. Using classical simulation-based 
estimators to estimate individual wtp values, in: Scarpa, R., Alberini, A. (Eds.), 
Applications of Simulation Methods in Environmental and Resource 
Economics. Springer Publisher, Dordrecht, Ch. 2, pp. 17–33. 
Hanushek, E.A., Kain, J.F., Rivkin, S.G., Branch, G.F., 2007. Charter school quality 
and parental decision making with school choice. J. Public Econ. 91(5–6), 
823–848. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.014  
Hensher, D.A., Greene, W.H., 2003. The mixed logit model: The state of practice. 
Transportation 30(2), 133–176. 
Hensher, D.A., Puckett, S.M., Rose, J.M., 2007. Extending stated choice analysis to 
recognise agent-specific attribute endogeneity in bilateral group negotiation 
and choice: a think piece. Transportation 34(6), 667–679. 
42 
 
Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M., Black, I., 2008. Interactive agency choice in automobile 
purchase decisions: the role of negotiation in determining equilibrium choice 
outcomes. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 42(2), 269–296. 
Hess, S., 2010. Conditional parameter estimates from Mixed Logit models: 
distributional assumptions and a free software tool. Journal of Choice 
Modelling 2(1), 134-152. 
Hess, S. and Hensher, D.A. (2013) Making use of respondent reported processing 
information to understand attribute importance: A latent variable scaling 
approach. Transportation, 40(2), 397-412. 
Hoddinott, J., Haddad, L., 1995. Does female income share influence household 
expenditures? Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire. Oxf. Bull. Econ. Stat. 57(1), 77–
96. 
Holmlund, H., Lindahl, M., Plug, E., 2011. The causal effect of parents’ schooling on 
children’s schooling: A comparison of estimation methods. J. Econ. Lit. 49, 
615–651. 
Hoyos, D., Riera, P., 2013. Convergent validity between revealed and stated recreation 
demand data: some empirical evidence from the Basque Country, Spain. 
Journal of Forest Economics 19(3), 234–248. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2013.02.003 
Lindhjem, H., Navrud, S., 2009. Asking for individual or household willingness to pay 
for environmental goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 43(1), 11–29. 
List J.A., Gallet, C.A. 2001. What experimental protocol influence disparities between 
actual and hypothetical stated values. Environmental and Resource Economics 
20(3), 241–254. 
43 
 
López, M., 2010. Cuando los padres se juegan la cárcel por meter a sus hijos en el 
colegio que quieren [When parents risk jail to place their children in the school 
they want]. http://www.elconfidencial.com/sociedad/2010-04-24/cuando-los-
padres-se-juegan-la-carcel-por-meter-a-sus-hijos-en-el-colegio-que-
quieren_483673/ (accessed 23 July 2017). 
Loureiro, M.L., Rahmani, D., 2016. The incidence of calorie labeling on fast food 
choices: A comparison between stated preferences and actual choices. Econ. 
Hum. Biol. 22, 82–93. 
Marette, S., Issanchou, S., Monnery-Patris, S., Ginon, E., Sutan, A., 2016. Are children 
more paternalistic than their mothers when choosing snacks? J. Econ. Psychol. 
55, 61–76.  
Marissa, A., Ishaaq, F. I., 2012. The correlation of perception on the role of father with 
academic achievement in senior high school student. Procedia – Soc. Behav. 
Sci. 69 (Iceepsy), 1369–1373.  
McBride, B.A., Schoppe-Sullivan, S.J., Ho, M.H., 2005. The mediating role of fathers’ 
school involvement on student achievement. J. Appl. Dev. Psychol. 26(2), 
201–216.  
McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in: 
Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, New York, pp. 
105–142. 
McFadden, D., Train, K., 2000. Mixed MNL Models for discrete response. J. Appl. 
Econom. 15 (5), 447–470. 
Millimet, D.L., Rangaprasad, V., 2007. Strategic competition amongst public schools. 
Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 37(2), 199–219. 
44 
 
Morgan, O.A., Huth, W.L., 2011. Using revealed and stated preference data to estimate 
the scope and access benefits associated with cave diving. Resour. Energy 
Econ. 33, 107–118. 
O’Neill, V., Hess, S., 2014. Heterogeneity assumptions in the specification of 
bargaining models: a study of household level trade-offs between commuting 
time and salary. Transportation 41, 745–763. 
Ortiz-Osés, A., Mayr, F.K., 1981. El matriarcalismo vasco. Reinterpretación de la 
cultura vasca. [The Basque Matriarchy. Reinterpretation of the Basque 
Culture.] Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao. 
Pérez de Nanclares, N., 2016. Educación reubica a los 73 niños cuyas familias falsearon 
el padrón [Education relocates the 73 children whose families faked their 
home’s location].  
http://www.elcorreo.com/alava/araba/201606/18/educacion-reubica-ninos-
cuyas-20160617223054.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 
Rubinfeld, D.L., Shapiro, P., 1989. Micro-estimation of the demand for schooling: 
evidence from Michigan and Massachusetts. Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 19(3), 
381–398. 
Sánchez, M., 2016. The chart that proves that Spanish schedules are downright weird. 
El País, March 28. 
Rungie, C., Scarpa, R., Thiene, M., 2014. The influence of individuals in forming 
collective household preferences for water quality. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 
68, 161–174. 
Scarpa, R., Thiene, M., Hensher, D.A., 2012. Preferences for tap water attributes within 
couples: an exploration of alternative mixed logit parameterizations. Water 
Resour. Res. 48(W01520), 1–11. doi:10.1029/2010WR010148   
45 
 
Swait, J., Louviere, J., 1993, The role of the scale parameter in the estimation and 
comparison of multinomial logit models. J. Mark. Res. 30, 305–314. 
Taylor, C., 2002. Geography of the ‘new’ education market: secondary school choice in 
England and Wales. Ashgate, Hampshire. 
Taylor, A., Woollard, L., 2003. The risky business of choosing a high school. Journal of 
Education Policy 18(6), 617–635. doi: 10.1080/0268093032000145872 
Train, K., 2009. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
Vega-Bayo, A., Mariel, P., 2015. School choice in the Basque Country: public, 
government-dependent and private schools with different languages of 
instruction. Int. J. Educ. Res. 74, 13–25. 
Vega-Bayo, A., Mariel, P., 2016. A discrete choice experiment: An application to 
school choice in the Basque Country. Unpublished manuscript.  
Viñas, S. R., 2016. Educación pone coto al fraude del padrón [Education puts a stop to 
census fraud]. http://www.elmundo.es/pais-
vasco/2016/01/12/5694bc80e2704ebd7b8b4658.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 
Whitehead, J.C., Phaneuf, D.J., Dumas, C.F., Herstine, J., Hill, J., Buerger, B., 2010. 
Convergent validity of revealed and stated recreation behavior with quality 
change: A comparison of multiple and single site demands. Environmental & 
Resource Economics 45, 91–112. 
 
 
